Carriers—Railroads by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 11 Issue 2 
January 1926 
Carriers—Railroads 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carriers—Railroads, 11 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 147 (1926). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol11/iss2/10 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
a partnership creditor may participate in firm assets, the individual
creditor in individual assets.
An excellent discussion is contained in Robinson v. Seaboard
National Bank, 247 Fed. 667, referred to in the principal case, and in
10 A. L. R. 842. In the Robinson case it is said: "This is not a case
of double proof on a single contract, but of single proof of two sepa-
rate contracts." These separate contracts may be embodied in one
note.
The present case, however, is to be distinguished as concerning
notes appearing to be nothing more than individual obligations of two
men. Evidence debors the instruments proves otherwise. In Schall v.
Cators, 250 Fed. 6, the court draws a clear distinction between the
liability of the firm entity and the individuals composing it. From
the principal case it appears that in the administration of bankruptcy
this distinction is carefully followed. Partnership assets must be de-
voted to the satisfaction of partnership debts before the creditors of
the individuals can share therein. The reverse of the rule is likewise
carefully followed. See 10 A. L. R. 846.
The real character of the transaction was not here in issue. The
claims in question were exclusively firm obligations, and no separate
contracts of pruaranty are mentioned as a basis for individual claims.
There is no showing of any benefit to the individual as such. While
the decision is apparently in conflict with what would be expected
from the face of each note considered alone, it is but another of the
many cases where a court of conscience looks to the substance behind
the form. R. B. T., '27.
CARRIERS-RAILROADS-Helena Southwestern Railroad Co. v.
Coolidge. Supreme Court of Arkansas (October 19, 1925), 275
S. W. 896.
Plaintiff brought suit for damages to his alfalfa field which was
caused by snarks from one of the defendant's engines. According to
Section 8569 of the Arkansas Statutes railroads are liable if common
carriers for property damage resulting from the operation of their
trains. The defendant railroad was duly incorporated under the Ar-
kansas Statutes, but denied its liability due to the fact that its small
trackage was exclusively used to haul lumber from a planing mill to
the tracks of the Missouri Pacific Railroad. Held: "When the de-
fendant was organized as a railroad company . . . it became a
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common carrier, under the statute referred to, and has all the powers
and is subject to all the restrictions of common carriers. If the
defendant is a regular organized railroad company, it cannot cease
to be a common carrier because it may only carry a particular kind
of freight for a single customer. It could be compelled to carry
freight to all who offered it for shipment over its line."
A common carrier is one who undertakes for compensation to
transport goods of all persons who choose to employ him. (Williams
v. Kingston Mfg. Co., 175 N. C. 226, 95 S. E. 366.) In Osage Tie
and Timber Co. v. Gory-Murphy Timber and Grain Co., 191 S. W.
(Mo.) 1026, the court laid down the rule that the test of whether
one is a common carrier is whether there is an indiscriminate dealing
with the general public.
The following cases will show that a private railroad established
as an incident to a private business is not a common carrier. Accord-
ing to a Louisiana statute, all railroads were deemed to be common
carriers, but the court held that a saw mill company which operated
a switch line on a private grounds for private purposes, was not a
common carrier. (Wade v. Luther and Moore Cypress Co.), 74 Fed.
517. In Wisconsin there was a statute which said, in effect, that every
railroad company was liable for damages sustained by employees
and caused by the negligence of other employees. The court held
that this statute embraces within its provisions only railroads engaged
in the general railroad business for the carriage of passengers and
freight, and has no application to a private railroad operated in con-
nection with a logging and lumber business. (McKivergan v. Alexan-
der and Edgar Lumber Co., 124 Wis. 60, 102 N. W. 332.)
Taenzer and Co. v. C., R. L & P. R. R. Co. (170 Fed. 240) is
a case with practically the same set of facts as Railroad v. Coolidge,
supra. A spur railroad line was built by a lumber company on its
own land to form a connecting line between its mill and the defendant
railroad. This spur was built by the lumber company for the purpose
of transporting its products to the tracks of the defendant railroad
for shipment. The equipment of the spur railroad consisted only of
an engine and a few logging cars. This spur railroad was held not
to be a common carrier as it did not hold itself to the public as such.
According to the decisions of the above cases, the Coolidge
case appears to have been decided contrary to the weight of author-
ity, and appears to be completely irreconcilable to the decisions of
numerous other cases with the same state of facts.
D. C. S., '26.
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